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Lars Hillersberg and Ulf Rahmberg. Eje Högestätt et al. (eds.), Lena 
Svedberg 1946—1972: Minnesutställning (Malmö: Malmö Konsthall, 1975). 
Ulf Linde, Lena Svedberg, Ulf Rahmberg, Lars Hillersberg, (Stockholm: 
Konstakademien, 1975). Lotta Svedberg wrote a two-page essay on her 
older sister, “Lena Svedberg”, which was published in Håkan Wettre 
(ed.), Siri Derkert, Vera Nilsson, Lena Cronqvist, Lena Svedberg, (Göteborg: 
Göteborgs Konstmuseum and Konsthallen,1975); reprinted in Högestätt. 
Besides these, Svedbergs work is found in surveys of the Swedish 1960s 
(e.g. Per Bjurström, Tre decennier svensk grak, (Stockholm: Sveriges 
Allmänna Konstförening, 1976), 148; Olvång, Våga se!. In the late 1990s, 
there was renewed interest in satirical realist art of the 1960s. See e.g.: 
Bo A. Karlsson, Ulf Kihlander and Ola Åstrand, (eds.) Hjärtat sitter till 
vänster, exhibition catalogue, (Stockholm: Ordfront, 1998); Susanne 
Carbin, Klass, kön och konsumtion: En analys av Lena Svedbergs bildserie 
Konsumentkvinnan, (Stockholm: Stockholms universitet, 2004); Carl 
Johan De Geer, Lena Svedberg, (Stockholm: Orosdi-Back, 2011). When 
the curator Fredrik Liew showed Aldman to the public at Stockholm’s 
Moderna Museet in 2014, it was the rst time the Aldman suite had been 
shown since 1976. Liew, Lena Svedberg, 5.
26 See Walter Benjamin , “Baudelaire, or the Streets of Paris” (1935), in: The 
Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap, 1999), 10, to see how this happens: But precisely 
modernity is always citing primal history. Here, this occurs through the 
ambiguity peculiar to the social relations and products of this epoch. 
Ambiguity is the appearance of dialectic in images, the law of dialectics at 
a standstill. This standstill is utopia and the dialectical image, therefore, 
a dream image. Such an image is aorded by the commodity per se: as 
fetish. […] Such an image is the prostitute — seller and sold in one.”
27 Liew, Lena Svedberg, 69: “[caption:] Suddenly all their troubles seem 
to be over / [the woman:] my beloved country there it is I recognize 
it / [Aldman:] congratulations”; Liew, Lena Svedberg, 70: [as Aldman 
and the woman hit the ground:] …splash! / [signpost:] Welcome to 
Democratic Republic of North Ireland / [caption:] They land happily but 
there has been some changes made in the Lady’s old country. She tries a 
professional restart”; Liew, Lena Svedberg, 71: “[the Lady, showing her 
genitals:] Psst! Psst! Psst! Psst! I’ll make special price for you, monsieu 
[sic], OK? / [Frank Zappa:] socialism and the pill has [sic] killed your 
business, ma’am”.
28 Liew, Lena Svedberg, 8.
29 I follow Liew’s identication here (Lena Svedberg, 9—10), since Noam 
Chomsky would make sense in the Swedish leftist political activist context. 
See also Chomsky’s widely disseminated anti-Vietnam-war essay, The 
Responsibility of Intellectuals, New York Review of Books, February 23, 
1967.
30 “Journaux: Puss [featuring Ulf Rahmberg’s cover with Superman as a 
penis], L’enragé, Ramparts, Le Monde, tricontinental, I.F. Stone’s Weekly. 
Liew, Lena Svedberg, 29.
31 Mailer’s article was published in Dissent (Fall 1957).
32 They also appear in T. S. Eliot’s The Waste Land (1922) as pointed out by 
Liew (Lena Svedberg, note 9 p. 4  [Swedish] p. 15 [English])
33  Benjamin, “Baudelaire, or the Streets of Paris”, 10—11.
34 Peter Wanger in e-mail to Charlotte Bydler, May 10, 2016.
35 Lena Svedberg graduated in French before entering Idun Lovén’s art 
school in Stockholm (1964—1966). In the autumn of 1967 she was admitted 
to the Royal Academy of Fine Arts. As Lena Svedberg’s career started in 
Stockholm, her father remained in Haile Selassie’s service until 1973 , 
when the Emperor was overthrown. Lotta Svedberg, ”Lena Svedberg”, 
Liew, Lena Svedberg, 6—7. 
36 Cf. the situationist slogans quoted in Christina Zetterlund, “Att göra 
politik: Om hantverk och konst vid tiden kring 1970”, in Tillsammans: 
Politik, loso och estetik på 1960- och 1970-talen, ed. Anders Burman and 
Lena Lennerhed, 371-388 ( Stockholm: Atlas, 2014).
37 Our translation. “Majrevolten i Paris 1968 hade en av sina kärnceller i 
École des Beaux-Arts och under några hektiska vårveckor producerade 
där en Atelier populaire inte mindre än 350 ascher, oftast tillverkade 
som serigraer och linoleumsnitt primitiva i tekniken, elementära i 
budskapet. De Gaulle var naturligtvis den som i första hand karikerades 
och kritiserades. Bilderna var av växlande kvalitet men skärpan i 
angreppen och upprördheten gick inte att ta miste på. I Sverige uppstod 
en motsvarande aktivitet.” Bjurström 1976, 145.
38 Liew, Lena Svedberg, 2; 16—17.
39 The ve detailed faces that ank the Lady suggest modelling on historical 
persons. One may be Nina Simone, another Mick Jagger. But who are the 
others: more performers?
40 If Angela Davis and Stokely Carmichael are correctly identied, are the 
others also militant revolutionaries or Black Panther Party members?
41  Olle Granath, Olle Kåks, trans. Gillian Sjödahl (Malmö, 2001), 20.
42 Mereth Lindgren et al., Svensk konsthistoria, (Lund: Bokförlaget Signum, 
1986), 465.
43 We are perfectly aware that this use of “the social” conforms to a myth, 
which falsely divides reality into a non social realm where social facts are 
distinguished as operative. Cf. Bruno Latour, Reassembling the Social: An 
Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2005).
44 Our translation. “Hur han upplevde sitt eget inträde i de arbetandes skara 
beskrivs i ’Stenhuggaren’ där en man sitter och hugger in sin mejsel i ett 
tunt granitskal som skiljer honom från en svart avgrund.” Olle Granath, 
Olle Kåks: Ett konstnärsporträtt (Stockholm: Wahlström & Widstrand, 
1980), 37.
45 The painting is in the Moderna Museet collection, Stockholm.
46 Kemp 1985, 110.
47 Michael Fried, Absorption and Theatricality: Painting and Beholder in the 
Age of Diderot, (Chicago & London: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980).
48 E.g. Jacques Lacan, The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, 
trans. Alan Sheridan, (New York & London: Norton, 1981).
49 Kemp, “Death at Work”, 115.
50 Liew, Lena Svedberg, 62.
51 Bertolt Brecht went out of his way to entertain his audience while also 
educating them. In a similar eort, Peter Wanger collaborated with 
Puss artists: not only with Lena Svedberg, but also Lars Hillersberg, 
e.g. on the cartoon Storfamiljen (Extended family, Bokomotiv, 1979) — a 
deconstruction of the nuclear family norm.
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arely a month after the news that Donald John Trump 
had been elected the next president of the United 
States, some commentators were hailing the end of 
Western democracy: 
Political scientists who normally study American de-
mocracy in splendid isolation are starting to turn their 
attention to Africa and Latin America. They want to 
know what happens when authoritarians win elections 
and democracy morphs into something else.1
In some Russian circles, the response to the election result was 
less the anticipated celebration, and more an exasperated sense 
of “welcome to our world” as the American electorate seemed to 
have chosen a candidate that combines Vladimir Putin’s power-
ful authority and authoritarianism with the buoonery of the 
long-standing Duma member Vladimir Zhirinovsky. In fact, the 
way Trump’s persona relies on a combination of unbridled mas-
culinity, celebration of authority, populist rhetoric, and mastery 
of the media spectacle displays many common features with 
Vladimir Putin, currently in his 3rd presidential term.
THEREFORE, RATHER THAN nominating 2016 as the year democ-
racy succumbed to right-wing authoritarianism, examining 
why such gures might hold appeal across vastly dierent 
political and social landscapes is ultimately a more productive 
endeavor. This does not imply ignoring the specics of the US 
in the 21st century, but complimenting existing accounts with 
additional factors that are less specic to the American political 
system, revealing more universal tendencies. Indeed, a num-
ber of complex reasons led to Trump’s becoming president-
elect. These range from fear and racism among those who 
by Maria Brock 
THE HYPERREALITIES 
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feel threatened by the increasing diversity of the US, to the 
hopelessness and anger of the white working-class “losers of 
globalization”, to the lack of appeal Hillary Clinton might have 
held among key demographics — despite having won the popu-
lar vote by a signicant margin. Not only is an intersectional 
examination of the causes of Trump’s election important to 
understanding how he managed to appeal to multiple sections 
of the populace, but the low voter turnout also suggests that 
analyses should turn to those who merely enabled a President 
Trump through their ambivalence or indierence.2 However, 
while it may not necessarily have been a messianic belief in 
Donald Trump that led to his election, there is much skirting 
around the issue of what makes him appealing. In fact, paying 
attention to the forces that prepared the arena for political g-
ures like Trump should not mean a critical turning away from 
their personalities.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUCH discussions insist either that dwelling 
on character is not productive in furthering a more sociological 
understanding, or that a psychological, let alone psychoanalyti-
cal reading is bound to succumb to cliché or even misinterpreta-
tion.3 Notwithstanding, there was clearly an “irrational’” ele-
ment in Trump’s victory, as the list of factors such as those men-
tioned above do not invariably add up to Trump-as-president. 
There is, however, another perspective that translates this “ir-
rational” element into evidence of less conscious forces at work, 
and which attempts a more “subterranean’” explanation of what 
made his presidential campaign so successful.4
Trump’s popularity ratings of 46% in November 2016 are of 
course no match for those of Putin, whose Russian approval 
rates were at 86% that same month — more than 15 years into his 
time in oce. As a matter of fact, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin’s 
approval gures are made all the more remarkable by the fact 
that the country is experiencing a palpable and lengthy eco-
nomic downturn and increasing isolation from the West. Despite 
all their dierences, the two men have frequently been linked 
this year,5 not least because each seems to have hopeful (and 
divergent) notions of what a closer cooperation with the other 
will bring. More importantly, both derive some of their power 
from an age of “post-truth” politics, in which they were able to 
rely on, and manipulate a public sphere that is characterized by 
increasing cynicism towards politics and disenchantment with 
established elites.
IN THIS ESSAY, I argue that while one cannot discount the real 
inequalities, as well as the real and imagined grievances that 
opened up the space for less established political gures to gain 
support, it is nevertheless worthwhile to examine why these 
particular kinds of candidates hold such appeal. Their reliance 
on spectacle and well-orchestrated exploits which combine the 
hypermasculine with the hyperreal enabled them to set in mo-
tion processes of identication that transcend the need for a co-
herent, well articulated political agenda. Instead, while seeming 
unsubtle to the point of being crass, they managed to operate on 
a more subliminal level, remaining oblique enough to become 
conduits for the electorate’s personal hopes and grievances. 
While this piece centers on the representational mechanisms 
employed by Vladimir Putin and his team of PR advisers, it is 
possible to identify a number of parallels with other contempo-
rary leader gures — chief among them Donald Trump — each of 
commentary
Buffy is a caramel and white Bulgarian shepherd Karakachan Dog. Buffy was ten-weeks old when he was given to Putin.
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“IT IS IN PART 
PUTINISM’S ABILITY 
TO ORCHESTRATE  
PR-EVENTS THAT HAVE 
SECURED HIM SO FIRM 
A POSITION .” 
whom appears to rely on a kind of hypermasculine charisma to 
unite a political eld that is otherwise increasingly polarized.
The president as spectacle
As mentioned above, it is in part Putinism’s ability to orchestrate 
PR events that has secured him so rm a position in the national 
and international imaginary. From a more technocratic public 
persona in his early days to the ubiquitous star of numerous 
“pseudo-events”, a typology of events featuring the president 
would demonstrate that all of them aim to highlight a certain 
skill or positive facet of his character, often one that falls into 
the broad category of traditional masculinity. They usually in-
volve the accomplished handling of a prop, or, perhaps more 
curiously, interaction with animals. Their political or strategic 
necessity is not always immediately apparent, while their staged 
nature is either transparently obvious or revealed later. Past 
“scripted events” — that is, events that did not occur spontane-
ously and were planned with the media in mind — include the 
President singing and playing the piano at a charity gala, ying 
a plane to help extinguish devastating forest res in the summer 
of 2010, driving a Russian-made Lada across Siberia, shooting 
grey whales with a crossbow, nding a pair of ancient amphorae 
on a diving trip in the Black Sea, and catching a pike weighing 21 
kilograms. 
In fact, a blurring of boundaries between reality and enter-
tainment in what one could broadly delineate as the arena of 
political communication, and in many 
cases a replacement of reality by enter-
tainment, is characteristic of the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. This has led 
to the creation of numerous “pseudo-
events”, some of which the public may 
no longer discern as such. As is the case 
with any type of ‘pseudo-event’, its suc-
cess is “measured by how widely it is re-
ported. The question, ‘Is it real?’ is less 
important than ‘Is it newsworthy?’ Its 
relation to the underlying reality of the situation is ambiguous. 
Its interest arises largely from this very ambiguity.”7 Notably, 
Richard Waterman’s statement quoted here refers to strategies 
employed by US politicians. The case of Donald Trump is in 
many ways an even starker illustration of the power of spectacle, 
as his forays into television and lm preceded his entry into 
politics. Indeed, through his appearances in lms and TV shows 
— always as “himself”, until nally cementing his brand in “The 
Apprentice”, Donald Trump the character was already a house-
hold name. While the Trump brand’s biggest supporter seems 
to be Donald Trump himself, closely followed by his immediate 
family, Putin assumes a somewhat more modest public per-
sona, letting his deeds speak for themselves. At the same time, 
the amount of Putiniana, or cultural output and commodities 
featuring the Russian president — from toothpicks to songs and 
calendars — is not too far from the manner in which the Trump 
name is used as a trademark, lent to products such as steaks and 
cologne, and turning a prot at the same time. 
However, the transformation of politics into entertainment 
products can also generate a greater cynical distance from 
politics in general, creating the impression that “in the enter-
tainment industry when there is a sign it seems there isn’t one, 
and when there isn’t one we believe that there is”, as Umberto 
Eco observes.8 Symptomatic of this disorientation is the media 
speculation that surrounded a walk the president took in 2013 
in St. Petersburg after the funeral of his rst judo coach. He 
ostensibly wished to spend time alone — without bodyguards 
or the press — in his old neighborhood, but pictures of Putin on 
his solitary walk soon ooded the Internet, often accompanied 
by the question whether this was actually staged, perhaps to 
imbue Putin with greater emotional depth, which would link it 
to several later occasions during which he was seen shedding 
tears in public. However, it is usually the newsworthiness of an 
event that trumps any such speculations. The fact that Donald 
Trump’s campaign often seemed to be less reliant on a coherent 
action plan than on his ability to tap into American voters’ ids, 
also points to the fact that spectacles do not need to rely on ter-
ribly intricate strategies, their crudeness instead lending them 
further appeal.
Populist rhetoric  
and identification
It has also been observed that Putinism lacks a series of coherent 
signiers that could enable the production of a more rigorous set 
of tenets to form or produce its ideolo-
gy. It relies on the gure of Putin — a g-
ure that is itself “empty” consisting of 
a series of attributes that are modied 
to adapt to changing times. Elements 
of Putinism have ranged from imperial 
notions of all-Russian greatness which 
hark back both to pre-revolutionary 
Russia and to Cold War rhetoric, to 
authoritarianism as well as to elements 
of Western-style democracy, linking 
regret and nostalgia for the Soviet Union to an endorsement of 
neoliberal forms of capitalism. Similarly, during the election 
campaign, Trump’s eclectic agenda ranged from virulent anti-
immigration legislation to drug legalization, and from defund-
ing Planned Parenthood to decreasing taxes for low-income 
families. In the eyes of some commenters, a strong leader such 
as Putin is, in his very idiosyncrasy, seen as the only potential 
gure capable of uniting this incoherent ideological eld. In-
deed, his larger-than-life public persona resonates strongly with 
the gure of the “charismatic leader” and his ability to mobilize 
mechanisms of identication as described by Sigmund Freud in 
his Group Psychology.9
HOWEVER, PUTIN HAS also been described as a populist leader 
— another feature, along with “retrosexual masculinity” he is 
seen to share with gures like Silvio Berlusconi.10 Examples of 
his forays into vulgar language include the promise to “nish 
(Chechen) terrorists in the crapper” in his days as prime minis-
commentary
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ter, to a more recent instance, again evoking unorthodox ways of 
punishing Chechen rebel ghters:
When, a couple of years ago, a Western journalist asked 
him an awkward question about Chechnya, Putin 
snapped back that, if the man wasn’t yet circumcised, 
he was cordially invited to Moscow, where they have 
excellent surgeons who would cut a little more radically 
than usual.11
These outbursts — recruiting the Russian “national other” of the 
Muslim separatist, and combining it with sadistic and darkly 
sexual imagery — occur very sporadically, but always attract me-
dia attention like incidents of Putin publicly telling risqué jokes.12
While the presence of such rhetoric may be partially related to 
past violence that has remained unexorcised from contempo-
rary Russian discourses, it sometimes appears to be employed 
with strategic intent. But why would the Russian president need 
this “obscene supplement” to his speech? And again extend-
ing the obvious comparison, why have Trump’s forays into the 
crass and the obscene had such positive resonance among many 
Americans? The president-elect is notoriously thin-skinned, but 
even his public obsession with the perceived size of his hands 
and what this might imply has receives less negative attention 
among his supporters than expected. Similarly, when footage 
appeared of him boasting how his fame enabled him to “grab 
them [women] by the pussy”,13 this proved to be less detrimental 
than his critics hoped. 
ONE EXPLANATION SEES the deployment of populist rhetoric as a 
way of strengthening bonds with the community, tailored to ap-
peal specically to society’s “ordinary” members. In the case of 
Putinism, however, and in contrast with Ernesto Laclau’s more 
optimistic take on the phenomenon of populism as serving to 
create new political identities,14 the president’s tightly choreo-
graphed publicity stunts and verbal “mishaps” in fact serve to 
encourage a move away from politics, as a way of continuing 
and maintaining the depoliticization which commenced in the 
late Soviet period.15 Populism can attach itself to any number 
of demands — in fact its reliance on “empty signiers” is one 
of Laclau’s core assumptions, but in Putinism, this demand 
emanates from the presidential administration itself, and rep-
resents an attempt to discourage political participation and 
potential dissent. Thought of in this vein, the potpourri of values 
drawn upon by Putin and his administration is not intended to 
represent a coherent set of tenets, but chiey aims to create an 
emotional eect, discouraging further analysis, which is easily 
achieved in a rhetorical move such as that of enunciating what 
cannot be said, in a manner that is normally taboo in political 
discourse. This again has interesting echoes in how the Trump 
campaign instrumentalized the disappointments of what is often 
portrayed as the white working-class and middle-class losers of 
globalization, even though some would argue that “their griev-
ances were more theoretical than actual, more media-induced 
than experience-related”,16 an argument later proven to be cor-
rect when it turned out that low-income voters tended to favor 
Hillary Clinton.
According to Slavoj Žižek, “the popular movement needs
the identicatory gure of a charismatic leader”.17 However, if 
all of a “popular movement’s” coherence and content are pro-
vided by its leader gure, then this also proves to be its weakest 
point. Putin may be the “master signier” that brings together 
the disparate, at times haphazard elements of Russianness and 
fuses them into the (non)ideology of Putinism, but a potential 
public rejection of Putin then also leads to the disintegration of 
this vision. Similarly, the distancing by many Republicans from 
Trump’s candidacy show the lack of support “Trumpism” expe-
rienced from established political gures even within his own 
party. Besides the construction of the infamous wall between 
the US and Mexico and his demand to have Hillary Clinton im-
prisoned, his populist melange of ideas and slogans was given 
only a semblance of coherence by Trump’s persona. However, 
the centrality of his supposed integrity and prowess also made 
his campaign singularly lopsided. With everything intentionally 
having hinged on the gure of the president, a turn to theories of 
identication therefore seems apt.
“A composite of King-Kong  
and the suburban barber”
The leader needs to nd ways of appealing to the group that will 
put him both in charge and in the midst of its members, so as to 
be both of and above them. How might one understand this dual 
identity? In Laclau’s words “his identity is split: he is the father, 
but also one of the brothers”.18 One easy manifestation of this is 
the (usually) red baseball cap Donald Trump wore at his rallies:
With his red cap on, the glossy billionaire living in a gilt 
Manhattan apartment appears to have something in 
common with the rest of the country, who wear caps 
when they’re actually at baseball games, when they’re 
driving tractors through wheat elds, when they’re 
barbecuing in their backyards. And maybe because he 
looks so ridiculous in it, Trump’s hat is something of an 
equalizer.19
In Laclau’s view, group membership makes the leader account-
able to the community, so that identication in facts suppresses 
authoritarian impulses and creates “a far more democratic lead-
ership than the one involved in the notion of the narcissistic des-
pot”.20 Theodor W. Adorno, too, argues that the bond underlying 
group identication center around the gure of the leader, but 
rather than seeking to exonerate the populist leader from the 
accusation of despotism, his focus is on the fascist leader. In his 
analysis, the primary identication with a powerful, authoritar-
ian father gure that takes place in fascist regimes is linked to a 
kind of regression or return to more archaic or “primitive” state. 
The paternal leader gure here resembles the primal father for 
whose murder the “primal horde” is then forever trying to make 
amends. The group members’ similarities with the leader then 
do not serve to quell the dictatorial tendencies in him — they 
commentary
are merely evidence of the narcissistic aspects of group iden-
tication: “While appearing as a superman, the leader must 
at the same time work the miracle of appearing as an average 
person, just as Hitler posed as a composite of King-Kong and the 
suburban barber”.21 Nevertheless the leader gure, in Adorno’s 
analysis, is not impervious to historical contingency: while the 
authoritarian element may be more pronounced under fascism, 
it decreases in importance in a less repressive society. What re-
mains is the need to convey an “impression of greater force and 
of more freedom of libido”22 than the rest of the community.
In the case of Russia, it appears that a classical panacea to this 
dilemma has been found. To achieve this, the government relies 
less on the President as sole master signier, and more on ways 
of turning Russia’s inherent tensions outward. Indeed, the surge 
of patriotism that followed the annexation of Crimea and subse-
quent armed conict in Ukraine may have secured Putin’s reign 
for another term. The newly drafted social contract no longer 
merely agrees to provide relative economic stability to enable 
consumption for obedient, apolitical subjects. Lev Gudkov, to-
gether with colleagues from Levada-Center,23 illustrates how the 
antagonisms of Russian society have been eectively channelled 
in a process of ‘negative mobilization’, whereby dissenters of 
that vision are branded as traitors, and members of the opposi-
tion press designated as belonging to the ‘5th column’. 
THE WAYS IN WHICH the Trump campaign had similarly relied on 
nationalistic ideas — chiey through a vilication of immigrants 
and the prelapsarian idea of “making America great again”— as 
well as the schizophrenic relationship it maintained with the 
media, simultaneously accusing it of lying while also relying on 
it to gain as much publicity as possible, demonstrates that the 
primer on how to win followers and inuence people relies on 
certain perennial and transnational principles, such as the ones 
discussed here. These include a presence both above and among 
one’s electorate, by combining superiority — be it physical or 
psychological — with the right amount of populist rhetoric or 
folksy demeanor. Internal tensions are best channelled outward, 
or in the direction of select minority groups. Originality is no 
strong requirement. In fact, relying on existing symbols and nar-
ratives is a plus as they enhance recognizability and serve to pro-
duce comfortable and comforting nostalgia. A coherent political 
agenda is similarly optional — personal charisma will most likely 
outshine sensible policies. Most importantly, the power of spec-
tacle and especially of the well-managed photo opportunity are 
to assume a central place in one’s political toolbox. Indeed, rst 
steps Trump made as president-elect do not bode well for the fu-
ture, both nationally and internationally. The real danger ahead, 
however, lies in the creeping normalization of Trumpism — a 
normalization towards which all of the mechanisms described in 
this essay will have contributed. ≈
Maria Brock is post doctoral researcher at Centre for Baltic and 
East European Studies, Södertörn University.
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